Abstract-In the network coding, we discuss the effect by sequential error injection to information leakage. We show that there is no improvement when the network is composed of linear operations. However, when the network contains non-linear operations, we find a counterexample to improve Eve's obtained information. Further, we discuss the asymptotic rate in the linear network under the secrecy and robustness conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure network coding offers a method securely transmitting information from the authorized sender to the authorized receiver. Cai and Yeung [1] discussed the secrecy for the malicious adversary, Eve, wiretapping a subset E E of all channels in the network. Using the universal hashing lemma [2] , [3] , [4] , the papers [5] , [6] showed the existence of a secrecy code that universally works for any types of eavesdroppers under the size constraint of E E . Also, the paper [7] discussed construction of such a code.
As another attack to information transmission via the network, the malicious adversary contaminates the communication by contaminating the information on a subset E A of all channels in the network. Using the method of error correction, the papers [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] proposed a method to protect the message from the contamination. The correctness of the recovered message by the authorized receiver is called robustness. Now, for simplicity, we consider the unicast setting. When the transmission rate from the authorized sender, Alice to the authorized receiver, Bob is m 0 and the rate of noise injected by Eve is m 1 , using the result of the papers [12] , [13] the paper [14] showed that there exists a sequence of asymptotically correctable code with the rate m 0 − m 1 if the rate of information leakage to Eve is less than m 0 − m 1 .
However, there is a possibility that the malicious adversary makes a combination of eavesdropping and the contamination. That is, contaminating a part of channels, the malicious adversary might improve the ability of eavesdropping. In this paper, we discuss the secrecy when Eve eavesdrops the information on the channels in E E , and adds artificial information to the information on the channels in E A sequentially based on the obtained information. We call this type attack an active attack and call an attack without contamination a passive attack. In particular, we call each Eve's active operation a strategy. Indeed, while the paper [21] discusses the robustness for an active attack, it discusses the secrecy only for a passive attack. When E A = E E , under this assumption Eve is allowed to arbitrarily modify the information on the channels in E A sequentially based on the obtained information.
The aim of this paper is the following. Firstly, we show that any strategy cannot improve Eve's information when the any operations in the network are linear. Then, to clarify the necessity of the linearity assumption, we give a counterexample for the non-linear network, in which, there exists a strategy to improve Eve's information. This example shows the importance of the assumption of the linearity. Similar unexpected properties for a nonlinear network error correcting code was reported in [20] . Also, when the transmission rate from Alice to Bob is m 0 , the rate of noise injected by Eve is m 1 , and the rate of information leakage to Eve is m 2 , we discuss a code satisfying the secrecy and the robustness. In the asymptotic setting, we show the existence of such a secure protocol with the rate m 0 − m 1 − m 2 .
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates our problem and shows the impossibility of Eve's eavesdropping under the linear network. Section III gives a counterexample in the non-linear case. Section IV discusses the asymptotic setting, and show the achievability of the asymptotic rate m 0 − m 1 − m 2 .
II. SECRECY IN FINITE-LENGTH SETTING
We consider the unicast setting. Assume that the authorized sender, Alice, and the authorized receiver, Bob, are linked via a network with the set of edges E, where the operations on all nodes are linear on the finite filed F q with prime power q. Alice inputs the input variable X in F 
That is, the matrices K B and K E are decided from the network topology and dynamics. We call this attack the passive attack. 
which is called the wiretap and addition model. Now, to consider the time ordering among the edges in E, we assign the integers to the edges in E such that E = {e (1), . . . , e(k)}. We assume that the information transmission on each edge is done with this order. In this representation, the elements of Z and Y E are arranged in this order. Hence, the elements of the subsets E E and E A are expressed as E E = {e(ζ (1)) , . . . , e(ζ(m 2 ))} and E A = {e(η (1)) , . . . , e(η(m 1 ))} by using two strictly increasing functions ζ and η. The causality yields that
It is natural that Eve can choose the information to be added in the edge e(i) ∈ E A based on the information obtained previously on the edges in the subset
That is, the added error Z is given as a function α of Y E , which can be regarded as Eve's strategy. We call this attack the active attack with the strategy α. Now, we consider the n-transmission setting, in which, Alice uses the same network n times to send the message to Bob. Alice's input variable (Eve's added variable) is given as a matrix
), and Bob's (Eve's) received variable is given as a matrix
). We assume that the topology and dynamics of the network and the edge attacked by Eve are not changed during n transmissions. Their relation is given as
To discuss the secrecy, we formulate a code. Let M and L be the message set and the set of values of the scramble random number. Then, an encoder is given as a function φ n from M × L to F m3×n q , and the decoder is given as ψ n from F m4×n q to M. Our code is the pair (φ n , ψ n ), and is denoted by Φ n . Then, we denote the message and the scramble random number by M and L. The cardinality of M is called the size of the code and is denoted by |Φ n |.
Here, we treat K B , K E , H B , H E as deterministic values, and denote the pairs (K B , K E ) and (H B , H E ) by K and H, respectively. In the following, we fix Φ n , K, H, α. As a measure of the leaked information, we adopt the mutual
Since the leaked information is given as a function of Φ n , K, H, α in this situation, we denote it by
When we always choose Z n = 0, the attack is the same as the passive attack. This strategy is denoted by 0. When K, H are treated as random variables independent of M, L, the leaked information is given as the expectation of
. This probabilistic setting expresses the situation that Eve cannot necessarily choose her position to attack by herself while she knows the position, and chooses her strategy dependently of the position. Now, we have the following theorem. 
This theorem shows that the information leakage of the active attack with the strategy α is the same as the information leakage of the passive attack. Hence, to guarantee the secrecy under an arbitrary active attack, it is sufficient to show the secrecy under the passive attack.
Proof: 
where 
III. NON-LINEAR COUNTER EXAMPLE
To clarify the impossibility of Theorem 1 under the nonlinear network, we show a counter example composed of nonlinear operations. We consider the network given in Fig. 1 
e (1) e (3) e (2) e (4) Alice Bob To send the binary information M ∈ F 2 , we prepare the binary uniform scramble random variable L ∈ F 2 . We consider the following code. The encoder φ is given as
The decoder ψ is given as ψ(
and Y 4 are given as follows under this code;
the decoder can recover M nevertheless the value of L. Now, we consider the leaked information for the passive attack. Eve is allowed to attack two edges of E except for the pairs {e(1), e(2)} and {e (3) , e(4)}. The mutual information and the l 1 norm security measure of these cases are calculated to
where the l 1 norm security measure d 1 (X|Y ) is defined as
| by using the cardinality |X | of the set of outcomes of the variable X. In this section, we choose the base of the logarithm to be 2. Now, we consider the active attack with E A = E E of the above four cases. (2) , e(3)} or {e (2) , e(4)}, Eve has no good active attack. To see the difference from the linear case, we adopt a weak secrecy criterion in this section. When Y E is Eve's information and I(M ; Y E ) < 1 for all of Eve's possible attack, we say that the code is secure. Otherwise, it is called insecure.
When Eve is allowed to use the above passive attack, (12) shows that the code is secure. When Eve is allowed to use the above active attack, the above calculation shows that the code is insecure. Therefore, this example is a counter example of Theorem 1.
Remark 4. Our analysis covers the optimal codes. As another encoder, we can consider
Y 1 := M + L, Y 2 := L.(14)
Replacing M + L by L, the analysis can be reduced to the presented analysis. Other encoders clearly leaks the message M to e(1) or e(2).
In this model, Eve can perfectly contaminate the message M . When Eve takes the choice (i), and replace Y 3 by Y 3 + 1, Bob's decoded message is M + 1. Under the choice (ii), Eve can perfectly contaminates the message M in a similar way.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC SETTING Next, under the same assumption as Section II, we consider the asymptotic setting by taking account into robustness as well as secrecy. We have assumed that the topology and dynamics of network and the edge attacked by Eve are not changed during n transmission. Now, we assume that Eve knows these matrices and Alice and Bob know none of them because Alice and Bob often do not know the topology and dynamics of the network the edge attacked by Eve.
When Eve adds the error Z n , there is a possibility that Bob cannot recover the original information M . This problem is called the robustness, and may be regarded as a kind of error correction. Under the conventional error correction, the error Z n is treated as a random variable subject to the uniform distribution. However, our problem is different from the conventional error correction. Since the decoding error probability depends of the strategy α. So, we denote it by P e [Φ n , K, H, α]. In the following, we assume that
as well as (3) . Since any algebraic operation on the finite field F q can be regarded as an algebraic operation on t-dimensional 2017 
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algebraic extension F q of the finite field F q , where q = q t . So, the matrices K B , H B , K E , H E on F q can be regarded as matrices on F q . By choosing n to be tn , the matrices X n , 
where the maximum is taken with respect to
with (3) and (15) .
The optimality of the rate m 0 − m 1 was also shown in [18] , [19] . Proposition 1 requires the finite field F q with infinitely large q. The paper [15, Appendix D] discussed the construction of F 2 t whose multiplication and inverse multiplication have calculation complexity O(t log t) 1 . By choosing t n = (m0+1) log n log q and l n := t n n , Proposition 1 can be rewritten as follows. 
where the maximum is the same as Proposition 1.
Combining Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we obtain the following theorem. 
Before our proof, we prepare basic facts of informationtheoretic security. We focus on a random hash function f R 1 The multiplication of elements v and z of F 2 t is essentially given in (124) of [15] by using the Fourier transform via the calculation on circulant matrices. For the inverse multiplication of an element v of F 2 t , we calculate 
for s ∈ (0, 1].
Proof: We choose a sequence of codes {Φ n = (φ n , ψ n )} given in Corollary 1. We fixk n := k n − m 2 l n − √ l n . Now, we choose a universal2 linear random hash function f R from F kn q to Fk n q . To make our code, we consider a virtual protocol as follows. First, Alice sends her larger message M by using the code Φ n , and Bob recovers it. Second, Alice randomly chooses R deciding the hash function f R and sends it to Bob via public channel. Finally, Alice and Bob apply the hash function f R to their message, and denote the result value byM so that Alice and Bob share the informationM with probability almost close to 1.
Since 
We set s = 1. Since the number of matrices K E satisfying rank K E = m 1 is bounded by q m2(m3−m2) , Markov inequality guarantees that the inequality
holds for any matrix K E satisfying for any matrix K E ∈ F m2×m3 q at least with probability 1− 1 q . Therefore, there exists a suitable hash function f r such that 
r (x)) = {x} × L for any element x ∈ M. This condition implies f r •f r (x, y) = x for (x, y) ∈ M×L. Then, we define our encoder asφ n := φ n •f r , and the decoder asφ n := f r • φ n . The sequence of codes {(φ n ,ψ n )} satisfies the desired requirements.
Remark 5 (Efficient code construction).
We discuss an efficient construction of our code from a code (φ n , ψ n ) given in Corollary 1 with q = 2. A modified form of the Toeplitz matrices is also shown to be universal 2 , which is given by a concatenation (T (S), I) of the (m 2 l n + √ l n ) ×k n Toeplitz matrix T (S) and thek n ×k n identity matrix I [15] , where S is the random seed to decide the Toeplitz matrix and belongs to F kn− 1 2 . The (modified) Toeplitz matrices are particularly useful in practice, because there exists an efficient multiplication algorithm using the fast Fourier transform algorithm with complexity O(l n log l n ).
When the random seed S is fixed, the encoder for our code is given as follows. By using the scramble random variable L ∈ F (6) , this number is given in (7) , which glows up double-exponentially. Hence, our proof of Theorem 2 does not work without use of Theorem 1.
V. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the effect by sequential error injection to Eve's obtained information. As the result, we have shown that there is no improvement when the network is composed of linear operations. However, when the network contains non-linear operations, we have found a counterexample to improve Eve's obtained information. Further, we have shown the achievability of the asymptotic rate m 0 − m 1 − m 2 for a linear network under the secrecy and robustness conditions when the transmission rate from Alice to Bob is m 0 , the rate of noise injected by Eve is m 1 , and the rate of information leakage to Eve is m 2 . The converse part of this rate is an interesting open problem.
